Taiwan's Arms Budget for 2006
Why, in my opinion, Soft Power + Defensive Defense = National Security
Considering that I've been living in Taiwan for the past seven years and kept a close eye on politics and military issues (as close as a teenager can) I'm amazed that I haven't posted regarding this issue yet.
In a nutshell, the arms budget is a proposed weapons deal to for Taiwan to procure 8 Diesel submarines, 388 PAC-3 Patriot air defense missiles, and 12 P-3 Anti-Submarine aircraft, costing 18.3 billion US dollars. This is issue has been very controversial in Taiwan, with the current administration under President Chen Shua-Bien (as of 2006) pushing for the deal, with the opposition party against it.
In order to discuss this, a quick examination of the background is essential.
Since 1979, Taiwan had sent off wish lists (shopping lists, possible military weapons) to the US, which were frequently ignored, save for the F-16 deal and occasional miscellaneous items, none of them extreme. However, in March 2000, then-President Lee Teng-hui took advantage of a situation in which the US was pretty pissed off at the PRC's undisguised and open meddling in Taiwan's presidential election and sent out a long wish list for military hardware including the infamous Aegis warships.
However, it wasn't until the EP-3 collision between the US and the PRC over the South China Sea in April 2001 that the angry U.S. President George W. Bush approved the sale. Curiously, President Chen Shue-Bien would later put purchases on the back burner for another two years. In early 2003, the US took the initiative in the arms relations, deciding on three weapons systems for Taiwan, which was the arms deal mentioned above, with the missiles, subs, and anti-sub aircraft (Also known as the Three Weapons Systems)
However, it wasn't until 3 weeks before the presidential elections on March 1, 2004 that the Chen Adminstration formally promised the US to go ahead with the purchase of the Three Weapons Systems, but then-Minister of National Defense Tang Yao-Ming refused to endorse it, freezing it temporarily. It would be until May 20 when Lee Jye took over as Minister of Defense that the Deal would receive MND support.
On June 2 (2004), nine days before the summer recess of the Legislative Yuan, the arms bill finally went before it. Since then, the US has been applying constant pressure for Taiwan to quickly push through the bill. Some say that if the pan-blue camps were in power that the arms budget would be passed immediately regardless of price, considering the willingless of previous administrations to buy anything the US offered. Assuming this is real, what has changed?
For one, the situation in Taiwan (and elsewhere) is quite different from say, ten years ago. In Taiwan, nearly all major economic and financial indicators are pointing downwards. Major military studies carried out abroad by third-countries point out that the PRC is currently already capable of launching a surprise attack against Taiwan (not by completely destroying the military, but by "decapitating" its government) - a fait accompli within a matter of days, spending most of the military forces keeping US forces out of the picture. Whether or not this is plausible depends greatly on Taiwan's ability to survive the PRC's first strike as it awaits international assistance.
Arguments against the arms budget point out (rightly so) that if Taiwan puts all of its defense eggs into arms that will not be deployed until the distant future (Confirmed to be at least 2010 or after) there is a disturbing chance that they will not be relevant in the event that they are actually needed (Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense and the DPP’s (the current ruling political party) Department of Chinese Affairs (2003), all unanimously predicted that between 2006 and 2010 the military balance between MainlandChina Taiwan Taiwan
Historically, arms purchases have been solely within the decision-making power of Taiwan's president. However, an arguable point is that since Taiwan is now a democracy (a relatively recent turn of events, arms purchases-wise), decisions should be initiated by Taiwan and decided in a democratic matter.
Taiwan's government should strongly reconsider the current arms budget, for the below reasons.
--Taiwan cannot survive in a prolonged arms race with China
--The weapons are particularly well-suited for defense
--The deal is too fucking expensive
It is still arguable that Taiwan will still need defensive arms considering China's refusal to reject the use of military force to unite the two countries, so it's obvious that we can't just scrap the idea of buying arms. So what would be a better deal considering the financial situation and effectiveness?
From a purely defensive military standpoint, the submarines (which happen to be the most expensive item on the shopping list) would have to go. U.S. apprehensions regarding capability and America's nuclear submarine-based strategy aside, the main reason would be that as of now it is hard to find a manufacturing country, and the extended delivery time (estimated minimum of at least 8 years) would mean that the submarines wouldn't be around to do the job that they're needed for. Even more discouraging is the probability that they would in fact be of little use against PRC forces.
Using the same concerns, the P-3 anti-submarine aircraft might be considered, but there probably ought to be a reduction in terms of both numbers and (more importantly) price. The current 40 billion NT price tag is far too high for the limited number of aircraft provided. Other arms that could be a better deal for the money include rapid response helicopters, anti-ship mines, land based anti-ship missiles and SAMs are all legitimately useful defensive weapons and should also be taken under careful consideration.
Alternatively, the money could also be spent on strengthening important military structures, such as airfield runways, fighter shelters, ammo and oil depots, communications, control centers, and other vital military assets. The cost of such preparation would be relatively low, but would also serve to strengthen Taiwan's ability to survive a potentially crippling first strike. What's more, this money could be spent domestically, helping the economy. (Although this is a lame excuse, as argued by myself against myself on this blog, but at least a positive side-effect rather than an end itself)
This kind of mindset is more oriented towards "defensive defense" and would arguably be a better direction for Taiwan's government to take.
Now what is the lame sounding "soft power" that I noted in the title, and what does it have to do with Taiwan's future national security? Soft power encompasses several different but equally important elements. First off, Taiwan is well suited to serve as a bridge among China, Japan, and the US. With its advantageous geographic location, Taiwan can also be a hub for maritime and continental cultures. Something that is somewhat unique and is worthy of mention is the familiarity of the general Taiwanese population towards Chinese, Japanese, and American culture and language, making Taiwan the least disliked member among the China-America-Japan-Taiwan structure. (Albeit 3 big and 1 small)
Other significant attributes of Taiwan's potential "soft power" is its (relatively) well functioning democratic system, free market economy, and arguably liberal society. If Taiwan plays its cards right the economy will flourish for a long time to come. And most people probably would agree that official negotiations between Taiwan and the PRC would probably be more effective in easing cross-strait tensions and improving national security than the procurement of weapons.
Taiwan's future niche depends more on the growing of "soft power", although it is indeed absolutely necessary that Taiwan maintain a certain degree of "hard power" (Which is where the "defensive defense" part comes in.) The best route for Taiwan to take in defending against the PRC is to preserve air superiority over the island after surviving a quick and sudden strike, as opposed to anti-amphibious or aerial landing. If the PRC does not have confidence in achieving a quick and painless success in a first strike, the likelihood of one happening diminishes. (Note I say here diminishes as opposed to disappears.)
In conclusion, based on the above thinking, Taiwan's military procurement should not be limited to the 3 items proposed in the 18.3 billion arms package, especially given that the current package is void of immediate practicality. The MND and other qualified defense specialists should explore and consider an appropriate mix if weaponry that is more economical, and pragmatic in the defense of Taiwan.
Considering that I've been living in Taiwan for the past seven years and kept a close eye on politics and military issues (as close as a teenager can) I'm amazed that I haven't posted regarding this issue yet.
In a nutshell, the arms budget is a proposed weapons deal to for Taiwan to procure 8 Diesel submarines, 388 PAC-3 Patriot air defense missiles, and 12 P-3 Anti-Submarine aircraft, costing 18.3 billion US dollars. This is issue has been very controversial in Taiwan, with the current administration under President Chen Shua-Bien (as of 2006) pushing for the deal, with the opposition party against it.
In order to discuss this, a quick examination of the background is essential.
Since 1979, Taiwan had sent off wish lists (shopping lists, possible military weapons) to the US, which were frequently ignored, save for the F-16 deal and occasional miscellaneous items, none of them extreme. However, in March 2000, then-President Lee Teng-hui took advantage of a situation in which the US was pretty pissed off at the PRC's undisguised and open meddling in Taiwan's presidential election and sent out a long wish list for military hardware including the infamous Aegis warships.
However, it wasn't until the EP-3 collision between the US and the PRC over the South China Sea in April 2001 that the angry U.S. President George W. Bush approved the sale. Curiously, President Chen Shue-Bien would later put purchases on the back burner for another two years. In early 2003, the US took the initiative in the arms relations, deciding on three weapons systems for Taiwan, which was the arms deal mentioned above, with the missiles, subs, and anti-sub aircraft (Also known as the Three Weapons Systems)
However, it wasn't until 3 weeks before the presidential elections on March 1, 2004 that the Chen Adminstration formally promised the US to go ahead with the purchase of the Three Weapons Systems, but then-Minister of National Defense Tang Yao-Ming refused to endorse it, freezing it temporarily. It would be until May 20 when Lee Jye took over as Minister of Defense that the Deal would receive MND support.
On June 2 (2004), nine days before the summer recess of the Legislative Yuan, the arms bill finally went before it. Since then, the US has been applying constant pressure for Taiwan to quickly push through the bill. Some say that if the pan-blue camps were in power that the arms budget would be passed immediately regardless of price, considering the willingless of previous administrations to buy anything the US offered. Assuming this is real, what has changed?
For one, the situation in Taiwan (and elsewhere) is quite different from say, ten years ago. In Taiwan, nearly all major economic and financial indicators are pointing downwards. Major military studies carried out abroad by third-countries point out that the PRC is currently already capable of launching a surprise attack against Taiwan (not by completely destroying the military, but by "decapitating" its government) - a fait accompli within a matter of days, spending most of the military forces keeping US forces out of the picture. Whether or not this is plausible depends greatly on Taiwan's ability to survive the PRC's first strike as it awaits international assistance.
Arguments against the arms budget point out (rightly so) that if Taiwan puts all of its defense eggs into arms that will not be deployed until the distant future (Confirmed to be at least 2010 or after) there is a disturbing chance that they will not be relevant in the event that they are actually needed (Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense and the DPP’s (the current ruling political party) Department of Chinese Affairs (2003), all unanimously predicted that between 2006 and 2010 the military balance between Mainland
Historically, arms purchases have been solely within the decision-making power of Taiwan's president. However, an arguable point is that since Taiwan is now a democracy (a relatively recent turn of events, arms purchases-wise), decisions should be initiated by Taiwan and decided in a democratic matter.
Taiwan's government should strongly reconsider the current arms budget, for the below reasons.
--Taiwan cannot survive in a prolonged arms race with China
--The weapons are particularly well-suited for defense
--The deal is too fucking expensive
It is still arguable that Taiwan will still need defensive arms considering China's refusal to reject the use of military force to unite the two countries, so it's obvious that we can't just scrap the idea of buying arms. So what would be a better deal considering the financial situation and effectiveness?
From a purely defensive military standpoint, the submarines (which happen to be the most expensive item on the shopping list) would have to go. U.S. apprehensions regarding capability and America's nuclear submarine-based strategy aside, the main reason would be that as of now it is hard to find a manufacturing country, and the extended delivery time (estimated minimum of at least 8 years) would mean that the submarines wouldn't be around to do the job that they're needed for. Even more discouraging is the probability that they would in fact be of little use against PRC forces.
Using the same concerns, the P-3 anti-submarine aircraft might be considered, but there probably ought to be a reduction in terms of both numbers and (more importantly) price. The current 40 billion NT price tag is far too high for the limited number of aircraft provided. Other arms that could be a better deal for the money include rapid response helicopters, anti-ship mines, land based anti-ship missiles and SAMs are all legitimately useful defensive weapons and should also be taken under careful consideration.
Alternatively, the money could also be spent on strengthening important military structures, such as airfield runways, fighter shelters, ammo and oil depots, communications, control centers, and other vital military assets. The cost of such preparation would be relatively low, but would also serve to strengthen Taiwan's ability to survive a potentially crippling first strike. What's more, this money could be spent domestically, helping the economy. (Although this is a lame excuse, as argued by myself against myself on this blog, but at least a positive side-effect rather than an end itself)
This kind of mindset is more oriented towards "defensive defense" and would arguably be a better direction for Taiwan's government to take.
Now what is the lame sounding "soft power" that I noted in the title, and what does it have to do with Taiwan's future national security? Soft power encompasses several different but equally important elements. First off, Taiwan is well suited to serve as a bridge among China, Japan, and the US. With its advantageous geographic location, Taiwan can also be a hub for maritime and continental cultures. Something that is somewhat unique and is worthy of mention is the familiarity of the general Taiwanese population towards Chinese, Japanese, and American culture and language, making Taiwan the least disliked member among the China-America-Japan-Taiwan structure. (Albeit 3 big and 1 small)
Other significant attributes of Taiwan's potential "soft power" is its (relatively) well functioning democratic system, free market economy, and arguably liberal society. If Taiwan plays its cards right the economy will flourish for a long time to come. And most people probably would agree that official negotiations between Taiwan and the PRC would probably be more effective in easing cross-strait tensions and improving national security than the procurement of weapons.
Taiwan's future niche depends more on the growing of "soft power", although it is indeed absolutely necessary that Taiwan maintain a certain degree of "hard power" (Which is where the "defensive defense" part comes in.) The best route for Taiwan to take in defending against the PRC is to preserve air superiority over the island after surviving a quick and sudden strike, as opposed to anti-amphibious or aerial landing. If the PRC does not have confidence in achieving a quick and painless success in a first strike, the likelihood of one happening diminishes. (Note I say here diminishes as opposed to disappears.)
In conclusion, based on the above thinking, Taiwan's military procurement should not be limited to the 3 items proposed in the 18.3 billion arms package, especially given that the current package is void of immediate practicality. The MND and other qualified defense specialists should explore and consider an appropriate mix if weaponry that is more economical, and pragmatic in the defense of Taiwan.
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